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The bogeyman of Russians providing Iran with "the bomb" remains alive and well in Washington. Indeed, at a hearing convened by the House International Relations Committee on March 18, the question of Russian support for Iran's nuclear program was repeatedly raised by members of Congress and cited as a major stumbling block for the development of partnership between the two countries. Successive U.S. administrations have viewed Russia as Iran's foremost nuclear supplier and thus believe that getting Moscow to cease all cooperation with Iran -- even in areas permitted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- is the principle counter-proliferation measure.
However, given Iran's rapid pace toward self-sufficiency, cutting off Russian assistance will no longer have a material impact on Iran's nuclear path. Iran can cross the nuclear threshold without receiving a single addition piece of Russian-manufactured dual-use technology.
Over the past few years, a series of revelations have revealed that the Islamic Republic is increasingly employing its civilian nuclear research program to gather sufficient knowledge and expertise to achieve a nuclear weapons capacity. The first shock came in August 2002, when U.S. intelligence reported that Iran had built extensive facilities for enrichment of uranium in Natanz. The Natanz installation currently contains 160 centrifuges needed for this purpose, with another 1000 under construction. The plan is to have 5000 operational centrifuges within three years.
In addition, it appeared that Tehran was completing another facility at Arak for heavy water production. The most recent IAEA inspection team has ominously found many traces of concentrated fuel suggesting that Iran has largely completed an indigenous fuel cycle. Given the sophisticated nature of Iran's program, traditional tools of counter-proliferation such as pressuring Russia and other countries not to engage in trade with Iran and instituting a more rigorous export control policy are unlikely to succeed.
Given that neither IAEA's more intrusive inspections nor pressure on Iran's suppliers is likely to obstruct Tehran's path, Washington has to devise a new strategy of pressure where Russia is an active participant. Tehran will only abandon its WMD program if it is made clear that violation of clearly demarcated red-lines -- including the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons -- would lead to Iran's total economic and diplomatic isolation.
The Islamic Republic remains vulnerable to multilateral economic pressure, particularly from its more reliable commercial partners such as the EU and Russia. Indeed, it was only after the European states suspended their trade discussions with Iran that the mullahs agreed to sign the additional protocols.
And this is a threat that the regime cannot ignore. Increasingly pressed to provide economic opportunities to a more and more restive (and young) population, Tehran needs trade and investment for survival much more than nuclear arms. As long as U.S. economic sanctions remain in place, Iran's Moscow connection is a vital lifeline and so gives Russia a good deal of influence.
If the United States is serious about preventing an Iranian nuclear breakthrough, Russia has to be a major part of the solution. A U.S. policy of continuously decrying Russian conduct and imposing sanctions and penalties is guaranteed to lead to Kremlin intransigence, at a time when cooperation is needed.
Moreover, the sanctions have no practical impact. The companies sanctioned are not seeking any investment from U.S. sources nor have any prospects for business deals with American firms. The only tangible result is an irritated Russian Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, the Iranian government hopes to exploit dissension between the United States and its key partners in Europe and Asia to deflect attention away from its WMD programs.
Shifting the focus away from Russia's business deals onto Iran's treaty obligations is an appropriate first step. The onus should not be placed on Russian companies to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that technology they legally sell to Iran is being used for nefarious purposes. Russia cannot be expected to accept U.S. calls for isolating Iran, especially when nothing substantive is being offered in return.
Both Moscow and Washington, however, want a non-nuclear Iran. So rather than pressing the Kremlin to abandon all ties between Russia and Iran, the Bush administration would be best served by enlisting Russian help to monitor the situation in Iran, and, if necessary, to serve as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran.
Russian-American cooperation has helped to defuse the tensions on the Korean peninsula. There is no reason this model could not work in the Persian Gulf as well.
Ray Takeyh is a professor of national security studies at the National Defense University and adjunct scholar at the Center for American Progress. Nikolas Gvosdev is a senior fellow for strategic studies at The Nixon Center. They contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
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