Chechen Leadership Isn't the Issue

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Chechen separatist leader Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev was killed by special forces troops over the weekend. Following the slaying of Aslan Maskhadov in March 2005, Sadulayev assumed the leadership of the Chechen separatist movement, but unlike Maskhadov, who won a popular election in 1997 to become president of the republic, Sadulayev was a president without a country, a commander without an army and a leader whose authority was not recognized by key figures such as warlord Shamil Basayev.

Before his rise to power, Sadulayev -- the last "president of Ichkeria," at least for now -- was a Muslim theologian known for his participation in religious disputes. His reputation as an expert on theology and Islamic law propelled him through the ranks of the separatist movement. Before assuming the presidency, Sadulayev headed the republic's supreme sharia court.

Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky once observed that Sadulayev "tried to bring together the radical Muslim faction and the moderate center, which is associated with Aslan Maskhadov. And to a significant degree he was successful." Yet the Chechen "mujahedin" are clearly in the midst of a military, political and organizational crisis.

The perception of Chechnya's "freedom fighters" changed dramatically after the 2004 school raid in Beslan that left 331 dead, more than half of them children. By crossing the line between terrorism and the mass murder of children, the separatists forfeited whatever legitimacy they may still have enjoyed in the minds of Europeans, Americans and even Russian human rights activists.

Strictly speaking, the terrorist attacks carried out by the separatists today look more like sabotage. There are no slogans, no political agenda. Their tactics are reminiscent of the old joke about the long-forgotten resistance fighter who blows up bridges on even-numbered days and derails trains on odd-numbered days.

Sadulayev's death did not have the same resonance as the "liquidation" of Maskhadov, which led to warnings in the domestic and foreign media of a radicalization of the Chechen separatist movement. In March 2005, many criticized the Kremlin for refusing to hold talks with the separatists. Maskhadov's death was even presented as a missed opportunity for peace in Chechnya.

The events of the last year and a half have belied such predictions, however. The Chechen "resistance" was not radicalized, but marginalized. There is no longer any talk of an independent Chechen state -- Ichkeria. Nationalism, which formed the political and ideological foundation of the separatist cause, has given way to a Muslim internationalism that encompasses the entire North Caucasus region. And the heartland of Muslim internationalism is multi-ethnic Dagestan, not Chechnya. The battle for Chechnya is now little more than one front in a much broader Islamist campaign taking place in the North Caucasus.

The terrorist attacks of the last two years, including Nalchik in the fall of 2005 and Tukui-Mekteb in the Stavropol region earlier this year, have been carried out in the name of "pure Islam" rather than "freedom for Ichkeria." This has long been the case in Dagestan, where more than 80 terrorist attacks were carried out in the first half of 2005 alone and where bomb blasts and skirmishes between authorities and armed Islamists are almost a daily occurrence.

Instability is no longer limited to Chechnya. The nature of the threat in the North Caucasus has changed. Nationalist terrorism has been replaced by the sort of Islamist terrorism common to the Middle East and North Africa. This helps to explain the declining interest in Chechnya, which as become just another case study in Islamist radicalism and terrorism. It also explains the media response to Sadulayev's death. This time around no one has demanded that the Kremlin sit down at the negotiating table with the Chechen fighters. And no one has insisted that Sadulayev was the president of Chechnya and a legitimate negotiating partner.

The question of who will succeed Sadulayev is less political than technical. The question of whether or not Shamil Basayev will assume control of the separatist movement is also of secondary importance. Nor can it be assumed that the movement would become more radical under Basayev's leadership. No one is stopping Basayev from adopting even more brutal tactics right now. Maskhadov and Sadulayev couldn't stand in his way, and the heir apparent, warlord Doku Umarov, will fare no better. But the Russian authorities should be worried not so much about Basayev as the social conditions that make people like Basayev popular, for it is the unfavorable political and social situation in the North Caucasus that produces Basayev's terrorist foot soldiers.

Last but not least, Sadulayev's death has been presented as a victory for Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, rather than for the Russian leadership and the security services. Kadyrov is now the sole master of the republic. His actions often violate Russian law and the logic of the so-called power vertical. No other regional leader is allowed such latitude. His inner circle includes many former fighters who ultimately realized that becoming a part of the Russian power structure was a whole lot better than taking part in guerrilla attacks.

Have these "pro-Russian" agents become law-abiding citizens who are prepared to respect human rights? That's a rhetorical question. And that means it's far too early to declare an end to the crisis in Chechnya.

Sergei Markedonov heads the International Relations department at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis.