Russian policy in Chechnya has reached an important turning point. An increasing number of high-ranking military chiefs are openly questioning the "seek and destroy rebels" policy that has officially dominated the Chechen campaign since the Russian army marched on Grozny in December 1994.
The Russian Army is tired of waging war in Chechnya. In battles in Grozny, soldiers and officers are dying, including the sons of Russian generals. Last week I talked with the deputy chief of the General Staff of the armed forces. The previous day he had attended the funeral of a young lieutenant, the son of his best friend, who died on Aug. 8 in a Grozny battle. This high-ranking general told me, "This war has no military solution. We need to seek a political solution. Enough of these senseless deaths."
Russia's security tsar, Alexander Lebed, and new Defense Minister Igor Rodionov have already said publicly that the Russian Army ought to be cut in size and reformed as quickly as possible to improve its battle readiness. They also believe that reform is impossible while the army is engaged in Chechnya. So the troops should disengage, and the war should end, but Lebed believes that Russia can still control the Chechens using economic and political pressure.
After a full or partial withdrawal of troops -- while maintaining control over several regions of northern Chechnya -- the majority of the republic's territory will be under separatist control. But Chechnya will not receive full independence, since the Russian constitution forbids the separation of any part of the federation. No referendum in Chechnya can legally decide the problem of sovereignty. And neither Lebed, nor President Boris Yeltsin nor the parliament in Moscow can legally grant the Chechens independence, even if they wanted to.
A constitutional amendment must receive the support of two-thirds of the deputies of both houses of parliament, and then it must be ratified by three-quarters of the federation's legislative councils. But since its approval in 1993, the Russian constitution has never been amended. It is hardly likely that an amendment supporting the right of secession has any chance of becoming the first amendment to the constitution in post-Soviet Russia's history.
A withdrawal of Russian troops will leave the rebels with a totally devastated country that no one will officially recognize as a sovereign state. No recognition means no legal trade, no regular foreign aid without Moscow's approval, an uncertain citizenship -- the same impasse as in Abkhazia and in the Transdnestr self-proclaimed republics. Lebed believes that after former Chechen warlords become statesmen, they inevitably will come to Moscow for aid to rebuild the shattered infrastructure of their country. Moscow will then have a lever of control more powerful than occupying troops and, in the end, the rebels will have to settle for only a semblance of autonomy.
However, Russian Interior Ministry officials believe that Lebed is wrong. They say that if the Russian troops leave, the Chechen rebels will come to Moscow not for aid, but to rape, kill and terrorize. Even some influential army generals who previously strongly supported Lebed and Rodionov say today that their peace plan is overly optimistic, and that a full withdrawal of troops will only facilitate the spread of fighting beyond Chechnya's borders.
For Lebed, it would be political suicide to forever link his name with the defeat of Russian troops in Chechnya. He can lose the nationalist constituency that voted him into the position of Russian security chief last June. The Lebed voters -- whom he stole primarily from Zhirinovsky -- want the war to end, want the boys safely back home and also want the Chechens subdued and Russia triumphant.
Like Richard Nixon during the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Lebed will have to find a way to press the Chechen rebels into making visible concessions. So, the main Nixon remedy -- to squeeze the other side into face-saving concessions through savage air strikes and bombardments -- cannot be ruled out.
It is hardly conceivable that relatively low-ranking and politically insignificant generals -- such as Konstantin Pulikovsky and Vyacheslav Tikhomirov -- are threatening massive carnage in Grozny on their own against the wishes of their immediate superior, Rodionov, and powerful Lebed. Not in Russia, where a defense minister can make or break any serving general's career at will, as Pavel Grachev did during the last four years.
The Russian Army is tired of waging war in Chechnya. In battles in Grozny, soldiers and officers are dying, including the sons of Russian generals. Last week I talked with the deputy chief of the General Staff of the armed forces. The previous day he had attended the funeral of a young lieutenant, the son of his best friend, who died on Aug. 8 in a Grozny battle. This high-ranking general told me, "This war has no military solution. We need to seek a political solution. Enough of these senseless deaths."
Russia's security tsar, Alexander Lebed, and new Defense Minister Igor Rodionov have already said publicly that the Russian Army ought to be cut in size and reformed as quickly as possible to improve its battle readiness. They also believe that reform is impossible while the army is engaged in Chechnya. So the troops should disengage, and the war should end, but Lebed believes that Russia can still control the Chechens using economic and political pressure.
After a full or partial withdrawal of troops -- while maintaining control over several regions of northern Chechnya -- the majority of the republic's territory will be under separatist control. But Chechnya will not receive full independence, since the Russian constitution forbids the separation of any part of the federation. No referendum in Chechnya can legally decide the problem of sovereignty. And neither Lebed, nor President Boris Yeltsin nor the parliament in Moscow can legally grant the Chechens independence, even if they wanted to.
A constitutional amendment must receive the support of two-thirds of the deputies of both houses of parliament, and then it must be ratified by three-quarters of the federation's legislative councils. But since its approval in 1993, the Russian constitution has never been amended. It is hardly likely that an amendment supporting the right of secession has any chance of becoming the first amendment to the constitution in post-Soviet Russia's history.
A withdrawal of Russian troops will leave the rebels with a totally devastated country that no one will officially recognize as a sovereign state. No recognition means no legal trade, no regular foreign aid without Moscow's approval, an uncertain citizenship -- the same impasse as in Abkhazia and in the Transdnestr self-proclaimed republics. Lebed believes that after former Chechen warlords become statesmen, they inevitably will come to Moscow for aid to rebuild the shattered infrastructure of their country. Moscow will then have a lever of control more powerful than occupying troops and, in the end, the rebels will have to settle for only a semblance of autonomy.
However, Russian Interior Ministry officials believe that Lebed is wrong. They say that if the Russian troops leave, the Chechen rebels will come to Moscow not for aid, but to rape, kill and terrorize. Even some influential army generals who previously strongly supported Lebed and Rodionov say today that their peace plan is overly optimistic, and that a full withdrawal of troops will only facilitate the spread of fighting beyond Chechnya's borders.
For Lebed, it would be political suicide to forever link his name with the defeat of Russian troops in Chechnya. He can lose the nationalist constituency that voted him into the position of Russian security chief last June. The Lebed voters -- whom he stole primarily from Zhirinovsky -- want the war to end, want the boys safely back home and also want the Chechens subdued and Russia triumphant.
Like Richard Nixon during the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Lebed will have to find a way to press the Chechen rebels into making visible concessions. So, the main Nixon remedy -- to squeeze the other side into face-saving concessions through savage air strikes and bombardments -- cannot be ruled out.
It is hardly conceivable that relatively low-ranking and politically insignificant generals -- such as Konstantin Pulikovsky and Vyacheslav Tikhomirov -- are threatening massive carnage in Grozny on their own against the wishes of their immediate superior, Rodionov, and powerful Lebed. Not in Russia, where a defense minister can make or break any serving general's career at will, as Pavel Grachev did during the last four years.