Last week President Boris Yeltsin showed once again that in a critical situation he is capable of acting, if not effectively, at least quickly and decisively. Maybe former acting Finance Minister Sergei Dubinin is an innocent victimof the crisis, and maybe Central Bank Chairperson Viktor Gerashchenko's resignation is unfolding in such a way that it threatens to complicate Yeltsin's always tenuous relations with the parliament. Nonetheless, the most important thing has been achieved: The president has made it perfectly clear that when Russia faces problems, he remains in complete control.


One can deduce from Yeltsin's immediate reaction to the events of Black Tuesday that he understood that it was not the ruble that was threatened by the crisis, but his government and, ultimately, his own position. It is also clear that the opposition was not at all interested in Gerashchenko's resignation; neither, in principle, is it interested in the resignation of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. No, the opposition's goal is to create a situation in which it will be clear to a majority of Russian voters that only one person is guilty for all the country's misfortunes: President Boris Yeltsin.


Last week, the opposition came very close to achieving its goal, but once again Yeltsin outsmarted them, even though he was forced to sacrifice Gerashchenko. There can be no illusions about the relations between Yeltsin and Gerashchenko. The antipathy between them goes all the way back to 1991. Despite this, however, Gerashchenko has formed one of Yeltsin's most crucial lines of defense during his tenure at the Central Bank. It was very convenient for Yeltsin to pin such things as the July 1993 currency reform and last fall's market panic on the "red banker." Only the fatal coincidence of the ruble crisis, the government's recent statements that the ruble has been stabilized and the fact that the government must soon defend its budget before the Duma compelled Yeltsin to abandon this line of defense.


Now, only the government is protecting the president. Ever since every Duma faction except Russia's Choice has, to one extent or another, moved over into the opposition, the government has been Yeltsin's only point of support. It seems unlikely that the current crisis will be resolved by next week's Duma debate on confidence in the government. Objectively speaking, there is no immediate need to replace the government (as shown, for example, by the ruble's return to nearly its former rate against the dollar). In addition, the opposition is not yet ready for such a move anyhow. But the tenuousness of Yeltsin's position -- which would only become more dangerous if the cabinet were forced to step down -- is obvious nonetheless.


These days, Yeltsin must be concerned first of all with strengthening his defenses. This task is complicated by the fact that he must keep in mind two basic facts as he decides on personnel changes. On one hand, he must choose major figures but, on the other, he must be careful not to create any threats to his position in next year's general election. In this regard, the most convenient figure to sacrifice may be none other than Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.


In the wake of Black Tuesday and Gerashchenko's resignation, Chernomyrdin's political influence has weakened noticeably. No party or organized political movement stands behind him. Therefore, unfortunately, Chernomyrdin may well be the scandal's next victim. Yeltsin must also think carefully about whom to appoint in Chernomyrdin's place.


Former Security Council head and influential industrial lobbyist Yury Skokov cannot be numbered among the possible successors. He is too strong a figure and boosting him further would be a mistake. Likewise, it would be foolish to invite former Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov back into the government inasmuch as he has been gradually positioning himself as the head of the democratic opposition in recent months. He is one of the most likely people to run in the next presidential election. Yeltsin could run a risk and try to politically neutralize Fyodorov by making him prime minister, but the Kremlin has never played such subtle political games in the past.


Despite the political costs, former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar continues to stand by Yeltsin. However, he may also present a danger in that he has his own party and the support of a significant part of the democratic movement. For this reason, the rumors that Gaidar will ultimately be appointed to Gerashchenko's post may well prove true, and it is easy to imagine what Yeltsin might be thinking. By placing Gaidar in the Central Bank, he would pick up the support of the largest faction in the Duma. At the same time, if Gaidar begins to get out of control, Yeltsin can take care of him just as he did Gerashchenko. It might even be easier. Even more important, as the head of the Central Bank, Gaidar would be in a position to provide protection both for Yeltsin and for Chernomyrdin.


However, even Gaidar's appointment to the Central Bank would not, in the long run, mean that Yeltsin can stop worrying about who will replace Chernomyrdin. But there may be evidence to indicate that the choice has already been made. Yeltsin himself fairly clearly hinted at the answer last week when he turned to his Security Council, which has served him so well during past political crises, to handle this matter -- which, after all, is really a question of economics. Council Secretary Oleg Lobov is loyal, unambitious and little known to the public at large. In short, he has all the necessary requisites to become the president's next prime minister.





Sergei Chugayev is a political commentator for Izvestia. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.