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As the second anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington rolled around, however, the two countries were struggling to overcome their differences over the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq. This crisis in bilateral relations revealed the Kremlin's lack of a long-term policy on relations with the United States, as well as the Bush administration's unwillingness (with the possible exception of the president himself) to build a meaningful partnership with Russia.
At their 45-minute mini-summit in St. Petersburg in early June, Putin and Bush agreed to improve the channels for communication on key political issues. Now the challenge will be to ensure that capable, far-sighted people use those channels to exchange fresh, productive ideas.
The U.S.-Russian agenda today is dominated by the security threats of the 21st century. The war on terrorism has a way of bringing countries together without uniting them.
The members of the anti-terror coalition all battle their own specific enemies, and pass this off as their contribution to the common cause. The United States goes after al-Qaida, Russia battles separatist fighters in Chechnya, China deals with Uighur insurgents and India with separatists in Kashmir.
International cooperation rarely extends beyond high-minded declarations of intent. To achieve closer cooperation, especially between Russia and the United States, two main obstacles must be overcome, the first being mutual suspicion; the second being reforms to improve the security services' ability to engage in multilateral operations.
It's not enough for the president to say, "Let's be friends." A new approach to "security management" is needed at both the national and the global level. The existing bilateral commission on cooperation in the war on terrorism should be converted into a permanent joint committee staffed by U.S. and Russian security specialists. A special high-level working group could be charged with developing theoretical and practical strategies for cooperation.
The spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially when linked to terrorist groups, represents not only the most horrifying but also the most pressing threat to international security. The nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran are matters of global, not regional, significance. The United States and other leading countries, including Russia, must come up with a common strategy for defusing these situations and subjecting them to strict international control.
The time has come to learn the lessons of North Korea and Iran, and to develop a joint U.S.-Russian strategy for stopping the spread of WMD.
Such a strategy, which could be developed by a second working group, would also include controlling the movement of nuclear materials, the threat of biological weapons and practical cooperation in the area of anti-missile defense.
Terrorist activities and the spread of WMD are facilitated by instability in a number of regions. It has been argued that the continuing chaos in Iraq is beneficial for Russia because it serves to keep the price of oil high. But under current conditions, Moscow would hardly benefit from a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the further radicalization of the Middle East as a whole.
Russian interests are not undermined by the United Nations' legitimization of the United States' leading role in postwar Iraq. As for Russia's role there, sending a peacekeeping force would be a symbolic but unjustified step. Russia would do better to concentrate on restoring Iraq's transportation, energy and water supply infrastructure. Stabilization of the situation inside Iraq will gradually make it possible for Russian companies -- perhaps even oil companies -- to get back to business in the region.
The situation in Afghanistan, where NATO has taken charge of peacekeeping duties, bears some similarities to the situation in Iraq. The issues of security and state-building have come to the fore. The production and proliferation of narcotics are serious security concerns. Russia has a strong interest in stabilizing the situation, and could make a major contribution to international efforts there -- short of sending troops to the region, of course.
After Sept. 11, 2001, a number of countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States became de facto allies of both Moscow and Washington. Some of them have allowed both Russian and U.S. troops to operate on their soil, and this situation is likely to continue for some time to come.
Moscow and Washington must, at a minimum, agree on rules for co-existence in the post-Soviet south. These should include constant contact between military and diplomatic representatives, exchange of liaison officers and information, an agreement on measures for averting accidental incidents, and so on.
A more ambitious, and more important, project would involve the coordination of U.S. and Russian efforts to stabilize the situation in Central Asia, and the coordination of plans for dealing with increased tension in any given country in the region.
Such coordination could include joint counter-terrorist training exercises, with the participation of local armed forces. In the future, it could also extend to the creation of a joint military command, financed and manned for a specific period.
The situation in the Caucasus presents serious security concerns in the short term. The impending leadership change in Azerbaijan could result in destabilization there. In Georgia, chaos could ensue following the departure of Eduard Shevardnadze from political life. Moscow and Washington must work out a plan under which both countries can effectively pursue their national interests in the South Caucasus. Successful U.S.-Russian cooperation in Armenia shows that this goal is achievable.
It would make sense to pursue U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus within the framework of a single working group.
Such working groups could also help to increase U.S.-Russian cooperation in developing the Russian Far East and Siberia. The more powerful partners Russia has east of the Urals, the better it will be equipped to develop and defend this enormous territory.
The first task is to create favorable conditions for attracting American investment and technology. Strictly speaking, this is a matter of economic cooperation, but in fact it would contribute to meeting one of the most serious threats to Russian national security in the 21st century.
A strong partnership between Russia and the United States could even help provide the foundation for a new system of international relations. Institutional reform of the UN will not contribute to an increased ability to manage world affairs. This goal could be achieved, however, by means of strong bilateral relations between the United States -- the hub of the system -- and the other major world powers: the European Union, China, Russia, Japan, India, Brazil and South Africa.
With such a system in place, management of global affairs could be achieved during the next 20 to 25 years using the formula "U.S. + UN." As the relative strength of individual world powers changes, relations within this flexible formula would alter accordingly.
This formula could work. After all, the main difference between the international system of the 21st century and its 20th-century predecessor is that the main threats to the community of nations issue from the periphery of this community and from beyond its borders.
This is the main lesson of Sept. 11, 2001. And it represents our best chance for peace.
Dmitry Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
