Security in Space

We have heard a lot lately from the new U.S. administration about the need to modify or cancel the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the 1974 protocol to it. These landmark agreements have, for nearly 30 years, effectively prevented an arms race in the sphere of missile-defense systems and space-based weaponry. There can be no doubt that undermining them now would bring a halt to the Moscow-Washington arms control dialogue and could well lead to the increased militarization of space.

At present, space is far less militarized than any other realm of human activity. However, the abrogation of the ABM treaty would immediately open the way to two new types of offensive strategic weapons: space-based anti-satellite weapons and space-based anti-missile systems capable of destroying ICBMs either in the atmosphere or in space (or, potentially, on the ground).

The appearance of such systems would present a real and immediate threat primarily to manned spacecraft and existing military and non-military satellites, which are virtually defenseless under existing international law. Several countries already possess the technology to deploy a whole arsenal of hostile weapons that could present a threat to manned spacecraft and existing satellites. Eliminating the ABM treaty would merely remove one obstacle to the deployment of these systems.

For this reason, I think that now is an appropriate time to propose to the new U.S. administration and to the world community at large the idea of concluding a multilateral agreement on the inviolability of manned spacecraft, non-military satellites and non-offensive military satellites ?€” including reconnaissance, meteorological, navigation, communications and other vehicles. Essentially such an agreement would cover any spacecraft not involved in anti-satellite or anti-missile warfare.

Such a document could be the centerpiece of the Moscow conference on preventing the militarization of space, which was proposed at the New York United Nations millennium summit in September 2000. This proposal could also serve to revive bilateral talks between Moscow and Washington on anti-satellite weapons, talks that were energetically pursued in 1978-79 but have been suspended now for 20 years.

Here are a few basic principles that could serve as the foundation for such a document and for the discussion at the Moscow conference.

First, such an agreement should contain a list of about 15 concrete hostile actions that would be totally banned as hostile to the protected spacecraft. This list would be somewhat more comprehensive than the one that was discussed during U.S.-Soviet negotiations in 1978-79. During those talks, negotiators failed to reach a satisfactory definition of the term "hostile act." In addition to banning such acts as the physical destruction of a spacecraft or satellite, a meaningful agreement would have to ban tampering with their orbits, dangerous approaches, scanning, docking or other potentially disruptive acts.

Second, this agreement must include a prohibition against attacks on space-control and launch centers for manned and unmanned spacecraft. I do not believe that such a prohibition would contradict the inalienable right of nations (as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations) to self-defense.

Third, such an agreement must include accepted measures of verification. A mechanism must be created by which all participating countries can immediately inform all others of any accidental or unforeseen damage or destruction of any covered space vehicle. Such a mechanism would also be activated whenever there was an accidental near-approach between covered spacecraft or any other situation that could be misunderstood or misinterpreted by participating countries.

In order to ensure compliance with the agreement, all participating countries would reserve the right to employ any existing national technical verification means at their disposal. Moreover, they would agree not to hinder the normal use of such verification means by other participating countries.

A standing consultative commission, similar to that created by the 1972 ABM treaty, would have to be instituted to monitor verification and to serve as a peaceful forum for negotiated dispute resolution.

In order to be as effective as possible, this agreement should be permanently open to signature by any nation wishing to join and it should be in force indefinitely. However, there should also be a withdrawal mechanism for nations that feel its obligations are inconsistent with their national security interests.

In conclusion, I believe that Russian-American relations would benefit very much if the Bush administration quickly completed the ratification process for six agreements reached in New York in 1997 that have a direct bearing on the ABM treaty and on the START II agreement.

Of particular importance are the special memorandum on the ABM treaty, two related joint statements and an agreement on the status of the Standing Consultative Commission. All of these supplemental documents will strengthen the enforcement of the ABM treaty and expand it by including Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. They will also help define the difference between tactical and strategic missile-defense systems. It should be noted that the State Duma last May already approved these modifications together with its ratification of START II.

Against this background, an agreement to prevent the militarization of space by protecting manned spacecraft and satellites would be a further, practical step toward bolstering global security at the dawn of the new millennium.

Vladimir Kozin is a senior counselor at the Foreign Ministry. He contributed this comment, which reflects his personal opinions, to The Moscow Times.