Cuba is a place of incongruous sights. Perfectly preserved American cars from the ’50s, some manufactured by companies that no longer exist, glide through crumbling streets. Equally incongruous is the Our Lady of Kazan Russian Orthodox Cathedral with its golden cupolas in Havana’s pleasantly seedy waterfront. The dedication ceremony in October 2008 was attended by the robed and bearded Metropolitan Kirill (soon to be patriarch) and Cuban President Raul Castro dressed in a dark suit and tie. In a display of commendable Communist integrity, Raul slipped away before the liturgical service began.
What gives? Why was this project, launched when Fidel Castro was still at the helm, paid for mostly by the Cuban government? There are only about 4,000 Russians living in Cuba, most of them Soviets who married locals. Some 30,000 Russian tourists come to Cuba each year, but prayer is probably not at the top of their list.
Many Cubans remember the years of Soviet aid fondly. Why not? They were essentially receiving free money, and consumer goods were plentiful as they haven’t been since. But the Cubans also retain a certain bitterness at the speed with which they were abandoned after the Soviet Union collapsed. In June 2002, Fidel said Russia had betrayed Cuba. And for the Russians, there is still the little matter of Cuba’s outstanding debt of $20 billion.
Cuba needs money, spare parts for Soviet military equipment and a sense of alliance with a heavyweight player. During President Dmitry Medvedev’s November 2008 visit, Fidel declared that Russia and Cuba were natural partners because both were “constantly threatened by the same adversary of peace.”
A senior U.S. official has stated that Russia “has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least that’s where they’re going.” Some say the Russians want to refit the listening post in Lourdes, outside Havana, which they abandoned in 2002, for use in cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare. Or the Russians might want a refueling base for their naval vessels and their bombers, which have resumed aggressive patrolling. (Right after Medvedev’s visit, Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Security Council, as well as Alexander Maslov, head of Russia’s air defense, also visited Havana.) But these are secondary, tactical considerations.
Russia’s No. 1 foreign policy objective is to keep Ukraine out of NATO. At the moment, NATO membership hardly seems imminent. Disappointed in liberalism, Ukraine is becoming more pro-
Russian, and Europe is relieved not to deal with that troublesome country for the time being.
But things change. A Ukraine disappointed in its rapprochement with Moscow could easily swing back to the West, at which time Europe might revive its interest in having Ukraine in NATO. Good chess players always think several moves ahead.
What piece can counterbalance Ukraine, which borders Russia? Cuba, almost on the U.S. border, seems the most likely. The Russians would not reinstall missile bases in Cuba, but they could beef up their bomber flights, naval exercises and intelligence gathering with in-your-face aggressiveness.
All sorts of unfortunate consequences could flow from this. The cause of freedom in Cuba would be set back for another generation, Florida’s hawkish Cuban exiles could tip U.S. politics to the right, and Moscow would be at loggerheads with Washington for years.
Though his attention is drawn by places as disparate as Yemen and Haiti, U.S. President Barack Obama should also keep an eye on Cuba, that isle of the incongruous, right off America’s shores.
Richard Lourie is author of “The Autobiography of Joseph Stalin” and “Sakharov: A Biography.”