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Everyone hoped Putin would give a direct assessment of the second wave of democratization that swept Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. They wanted an honest account of the government's failures in these countries, and a reaction to the new dialogue between Ukraine and NATO, and Ukraine and the EU, as well as to similar processes unfolding in Georgia and Moldova. As the president recently met with Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, everyone was waiting for some clarification about unification. But they heard nothing of the sort.
Instead, we heard something foggy about the common fate that all the nations of the former Soviet Union shared and that Russia intended to continue pursuing its "civilizing mission" in Eurasia. Apparently, the Kremlin has no idea what to do with its neighbors. And with national elections around the corner in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia, this does not bode well for Russian policy. Similar problems loom in relations with the new governments in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.
2004 was the worst year in recent Russian history in terms of terrorist activity. The number of terrorist attacks doubled, as did the number of victims. The real watershed was Beslan, where the federal authorities once again demonstrated their inability to prevent major acts of terrorism. Earlier this year, Aslan Maskhadov was killed, but soldiers and police officers are still dying on a regular basis in Chechnya and neighboring republics. In Dagestan alone, 40 soldiers and policemen have died since the beginning of the year. In response, Putin talked generally about the development of the "South" and the need for parliamentary elections in Chechnya this year. Apparently, there is still no strategy for bringing peace to Chechnya. Or perhaps the president did not find it necessary to discuss the details.
Capital flight is now four times higher than in 2003. The stock market is stagnating. Business confidence in the government has been undermined, primarily by the Yukos affair. Economic growth has slowed. Inflation is proving hard to control. These negative developments were not mentioned at all by the president. His response to the increasingly negative trends in the economy was a combination of contradictory cures.
On one hand, the president spoke of a liberal capital amnesty, of doing away with the inheritance tax and of reducing the statute of limitations on reviews of privatization deals. On the other, he named a wide variety of industries that should be closed to foreign investors. It seems highly doubtful that this semi-closed, quasi-liberal state capitalist model will prove very efficient in today's world. It is also unclear where Putin will find the huge amount of resources needed to maintain oil and gas production at current levels, or how the state will undertake multibillion-ruble infrastructure projects without attracting major foreign investment.
While avoiding the subjects of Ukraine, Beslan and Yukos, Putin dedicated himself heart and soul to freedom and democracy. Freedom was the catchword for this year's address. And some strange things are afoot on the freedom front, the president noted. It turns out that there is no freedom of speech in Russia, and that even the leaders of parliament factions do not have access to the airwaves. The president promised to fix this and set up a commission for freedom on television comprised of members of the recently founded Public Chamber, whose deputies are appointed by the president.
Putin even said that the period of "stabilization" of the Russian state -- which the president naturally reasoned was an absolute necessity -- was over and the period of development had begun. Bureaucrats got an earful and were accused of corruption and arrogance. The president once again promised to limit the bureaucracy's power over the public, including over entrepreneurs.
However, Putin did not question any of his past initiatives in the slightest, the very moves that led Russia toward political monopoly. The president himself put an end to gubernatorial elections and initiated draconian bills on single-mandate districts, public demonstrations, referendums and political parties. The last version of the bill on electing deputies to the State Duma, proposed by Putin himself, raises the percentage of votes needed to make it into the parliament to 7 percent, doubles the deposit required to register a party, reduces the percentage of permitted questionable signatures on petitions by a third, and bars independent and international observers from polling places.
The main problem threatening freedom in Russia is Vladimir Putin and his administration, which makes his "freedom manifesto" seem extremely insincere. The presidential speechwriter dropped some hints on how to interpret the address. The speech contains an important passage stating that Russia needs to move toward democracy at its own pace and in its own way. Those who resist will be punished harshly, but within the limits of the law. What is the difference between this rhetoric and that of Belarus' president, who also often speaks out in favor of "freedom"? In essence, there is no difference at all.
The few positive messages in the address -- the correct conclusions and proposals regarding immigration policy or the sprinkling of liberal economic initiatives -- were lost against a backdrop of reduced freedoms, increasing corruption of the bureaucrats, economic monopolization and the legal free-for-all in law enforcement agencies and the courts.
Russia's future as envisioned by Putin looks something like this: The political system will be one of presidential authoritarianism with small and carefully managed doses of glasnost and with predetermined "elections," when they are held at all. The economy will be one of monopolistic state capitalism managed with the help of "approved" oligarchs and with strict limits on foreign participation. Russia's relations with CIS countries will continue to encourage frozen conflicts. Foreign policy will remain utterly opaque. Petrodollars will be redistributed to those on government payrolls, and state salaries will increase by 50 percent over the next three years. The government will be more cautious about reforms after the disaster of benefits monetization. Thus, the four pillars of Putin's Russia are authoritarianism, state capitalism, post-imperialism and petrodollar handouts.
I have few doubts that this model will not accomplish much. Instead of solving the country's problems, it will only make them worse. Russia's democratic opposition needs to come up with better goals and an alternative plan that can win the support of the public.
Vladimir Ryzhkov is an independent deputy in the State Duma. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
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