In Search of a Free Georgia and South Ossetia

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Last week, tension between Russia and Georgia, which had been growing since the Rose Revolution brought Georgia's reformist, pro-U.S. President Mikheil Saakashvili to power in 2004, finally led to open hostility between the two countries. On Thursday, the Georgian government sent troops into the disputed territory of South Ossetia to pacify that region and restore it to Georgian control. Russia waited a day before sending its tanks into South Ossetia and demonstrating its dominance of the air by bombing various places in Georgia, including two Georgian bases near Tbilisi. If the hostilities continue and the conflicts continue for more than a few days, Georgia's future and sovereignty may well be jeopardized. This is precisely what Russia has wanted since Saakashvili committed to building a strong, independent and Western oriented Georgia in 2004.

The Georgian government has made its desire to bring South Ossetia -- as well as the other breakaway region, Abkhazia -- back into Tbilisi's control clear for several years now. But the decision to send in troops on Thursday surprised many. Georgia's decision, although not altogether unjustified, was a bizarre strategic mistake. South Ossetian forces had been provoking Georgia, but by escalating the conflict and announcing that Georgian troops controlled most of South Ossetia, Tbilisi all but ensured a Russian military response. Perhaps some in the Georgian government thought that if they moved quickly, when the world was focusing on the Olympics in Beijing, they could get away with no Russian response, but that was clearly an unrealistic hope.

Russia's response, however, was way beyond what was necessary to, according to its initial explanation, "protect Russian citizens." It is worth noting that the "Russian citizens" in question here are actually residents of South Ossetia to whom Moscow gave Russian passports. Similarly, while Russian planes have flown over Georgian airspace and dropped bombs on its territory, Georgian troops have only fought on their own territory or that of the breakaway regions. It has been a long time since a Georgian has fired a shot in anger on Russian soil. Contrary to Russian propaganda, the threat Georgia represents to Russia is trivial. The reverse is not true.

Most of the Western media outlets have focused on the skirmishes between Russian and Georgian troops in South Ossetia, while paying less attention to the equally important story that Russian planes have bombed military and civilian targets throughout Georgia. The Russian bombing campaign, buoyed by far superior air forces, threatens to weaken, divide or even destroy the Georgian state. If this bombing continues for even a few more days, it is easy to imagine a scenario where Georgia's infrastructure and economy could be set back a decade or more. It is also easy to imagine far worse scenarios.

The immediate goal of the West now should be to find a way to stop Russia's bombing campaign over Georgia right away. There is, however, no easy way to achieve this goal, particularly as quickly as is needed. Strongly worded statements from Western leaders are necessary but far from sufficient. But doing something more than this is a daunting task for the United States and others who would like to help Georgia. The Georgian government has made a strong appeal to Washington to intervene and support Georgia, urging the United States to stand up for its ideals and its friends. Although U.S. President George W. Bush would like to help Georgia in its moment of need, the United States is bound by several realities, including being overcommitted militarily in other parts of the globe and the dubious wisdom risking a broader U.S. conflict with Russia. Other options include NATO planes protecting Georgian airspace, but this also involves a risk of a broader conflict between NATO and Russia.

A military response is not the only option facing the United States and Europe, but it seems to be the one its Georgian allies would most like to see. Nonetheless, in the next days, the West must find a way to stop Russia from routing Georgia. If this attack continues for even a few more days, Georgian civilian casualties will mount, infrastructure will be destroyed, and the government will be destabilized. All of this will be disastrous for Georgia, and the future of that country will become uncertain. Even if Russia stops this aggression reasonably soon, the West will have to determine how best to both help rebuild Georgia, politically and physically as well as to how to address the tensions between Georgia and Russia, which will only become stronger after these events.

The bigger challenge for the United States and its European allies is to address the real reasons behind the conflict between Georgia and Russia, which have been festering for over a decade. The United States should acknowledge that the Georgian government is capable of saber-rattling and that the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not want to be a part of Georgia. At the same time, Bush and his successor should understand that the broad threat faced by Georgia from Russia is real and caused largely by the desire of the Georgian people and their leaders to be free, independent and pro-West.

Lincoln A. Mitchell, the Arnold A. Saltzman assistant professor of international politics at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, is the author of the forthcoming book "Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution."